

Twentieth Century China through Historical Anthropology Workshop

**19 to 20 September, 2015
Hong Kong and Guangzhou**

Co-organisers:

Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

CUHK-SYSU Centre for Historical Anthropology, The Chinese University of Hong Kong
University of Oxford

Center for South China Business History, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics



List of Participants

| Name | Affiliation |
|-------------------|---|
| Igor Chabrowski | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Ching May-bo | Sun Yat-sen University |
| Du Zhengzhen | Zhejiang University |
| Thomas Dubois | Australian National University |
| Aurore Dumont | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| David Faure | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Feng Xiaocai | East China Normal University |
| Anthony Garnaut | University of Melbourne |
| Vincent Goossaert | École pratique des hautes études |
| He Xi | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Huang Sujuan | Guangdong University of Finance and Economics |
| Paul Katz | Academia Sinica |
| Jan Kiely | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| John Lagerwey | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |
| Micah Muscolino | Oxford University |
| Rao Weixin | Xiamen University |
| Wu Ka Ming | The Chinese University of Hong Kong |

Programme

**19 September 2015 (Saturday):
Twentieth Century China through Historical Anthropology Workshop at CUHK**

| Time | Programme | Remarks |
|-------------|--|---|
| From 07:30 | Guesthouse breakfast available | Breakfast bread, coffee and tea will be available at YIA |
| 8:15 | Board bus for YIA | Please check out and take all your belongings with you, as we will depart for China after the workshop. |
| 8:30-8:45 | Welcome – Jan KIELY | |
| 8:45-9:15 | Briefing introduction – David FAURE | |
| | Individual Project Introduction: | |
| 9:15-9:30 | Igor CHABROWSKI | |
| 9:30-9:45 | CHING May-bo | |
| 9:45-10:00 | DU Zhengzhen | |
| 10:00-10:15 | Thomas DUBOIS | |
| 10:15-10:30 | TEA BREAK | |
| | Individual Project Introduction: | |
| 10:30-10:45 | Aurore DUMONT | |
| 10:45-11:00 | Anthony GARNAUT | |
| 11:00-11:15 | Vincent GOOSSAERT | |
| 11:15-11:30 | HE Xi | |
| 11:30-11:45 | Paul KATZ | |
| 11:45-12:00 | Jan KIELY | |
| 12:00-13:00 | LUNCH GENERAL DISCUSSION | |
| | Individual Project Introduction: | |
| 13:00-14:15 | John LAGERWEY | |
| 13:15-13:30 | Micah MUSCOLINO | |
| 13:30-13:45 | WU Kaming | |
| 13:45-14:00 | RAO Weixin | |
| 14:00-14:15 | HUANG Sujuan | |
| 14:15-15:00 | General Discussion: Themes and Workshops | |
| | End of Workshop | |
| 16:00-17:00 | Leave CUHK for Lok Ma Chau (Futian Port) border-crossing | |
| 17:00-20:00 | Board Guangdong University of Finance and Economics bus –Introduction by Dr. WANG Sujuan | |
| 20:00-20:15 | Estimated arrival Guangdong Victory Hotel | |
| From 20:45 | Dinner at hotel or nearby | |

Programme

20 September 2015 (Sunday):

Guangzhou Historical Anthropology Tour

Theme: Thinking about Guangzhou in the 1950s-60s (before 1966) with Historical Anthropology

| Time | Event / Venue | Remarks |
|---------------|-------------------------------------|------------------|
| 8:30-8:45 | 沙面-粵海關 | 步行 |
| 8:45-9:15 | 粵海關-南方大廈-博濟醫院-愛群大廈-海珠南路-一德路-石室聖心大教堂 | 步行，在石室廣場小休 15 分鐘 |
| 9:30-10:00 | 一德路-惠福西路-米市路-光塔路-懷聖寺 | 一德路上車，惠福西路下車 |
| 10:10-10:20 | 光塔路-朝天路-陶街 | 步行 |
| 10:30-10:50 | 陶街-解放中路-中山五路-教育路-藥洲遺址 | 步行，藥洲遺址小休 15 分鐘 |
| 11:05 - 11:25 | 教育路-大佛寺-北京路 | 步行 |
| 11:25 - 12:20 | 北京路（拱北樓、銅壺滴漏、宋明街道、騎樓、財政廳） | 步行 |
| 12:20 - 13:30 | 太平館西餐廳午餐 | 新館三樓 |
| 13:30-13:40 | 北京路-人民公園 | 步行 |
| 13:40-14:00 | 人民公園-中山紀念堂 | 步行 |
| 14:10-14:30 | 中山紀念堂-東山模範住宅區 | 乘車至曙前路下車 |
| 15:00-15:10 | 恤孤院路-華僑新村 | 在中共三大會址旁上車 |
| 15:30-16:00 | 華僑新村-紅專廠 | 乘車 |
| 16:00-18:00 | 紅專廠 | 渡空間下午茶及自由討論 |
| 18:00-20:30 | 從廣州返回深圳福田口岸 | 乘車 |

(Arranged by Guangdong University of Finance and Economics)

Igor Chabrowski (CUHK)

Opera in Sichuan: theater as social institution and the politics of culture in early twentieth century China

My project explores the opera in Sichuan as a social institution. By social institution I mean a firmly established and widely pervasive form of communal organization and practice that is indispensable for the constitution and perpetuation of the communities. During the twentieth century, opera evolved, adjusting to the changing commercial urban environment and being concurrently appropriated by new political groups seeking to harness it to their particular needs. What I would like to examine are the forms and consequences of the various usurpations of opera, how they reflected power struggles during the first half of the twentieth century (1900s–1957), how they affected Sichuanese society and its culture, and how they influenced the way opera was performed. Or, in short, why did opera change so much and what was the “social” price of this transformation? Some other main questions are: what does shift in culture tell us about the relationships between the state, national elites, local elites, provincial intellectuals, and the world of petty urbanites and villagers? What was so attractive about copying the models from Shanghai and Beijing? Were these models and fashions adopted or rejected and did it bring eradication of local styles of rural and commercial opera? Approaching opera not only as a form of art but also as a social institution implies taking into account that from the outset, in its rural and urban roots, it was an integral part of the local communities’ social life. Its staging, performance, repertoire, and above all, the people who funded it, performed it, and watched it are all significant to its socio-cultural constitution. Thus, the opera can be seen as stage of social construction, contestation, and power struggle in the local societies and in the province.

In the late-Qing market-towns and cities opera was a locally managed institution fundamental for communities’ cultural self-identification. We can list three of its interconnected functions: it was an integral part of the religious festivals and rituals; funding and staging opera was a form of exercising elite patronage that sustained their political power; opera was a form of entertainment-cum-education satisfying the ludic and intellectual needs across class divides. In the first years of the twentieth century commercial theatre became the most distinct cultural establishment of the bigger cities and through its diversity of styles (*qiang* 腔) it could speak to people of diverse backgrounds. The commercial stage rendered theatre not a form of patronage but a money making venture that also enhanced the social status of the owner. The commercialized theatre, however, quickly came into conflict with nationalist modernizers who found it both disturbing as well as in need of reform and thorough revision to serve their progressive agenda. This trend was strengthened further during the Sino-Japanese War when the whole Southwest was effectively colonized by the central government. Opera became an important channel for propaganda and reform, while its commercial and communal manifestations were ignored and at times suppressed by the local and national power holders. The Communist government very quickly asserted its own vision of opera in which the modernizing aims were linked to rewriting the whole art form according to socialist realist percepts while actors were sent to “study” the working class life, needs, and mentality in the factories. The concurrent policy of gathering, classifying, and standardizing various forms of opera saw it categorized as a part of “folklore” within the centralized and administratively ordered Chinese culture.

I have gathered substantial material on the Republican commercial opera and reformist intellectuals as well as on the opera reforms in the early 1950s. Further research will include collecting materials pertaining to the wartime prohibitions and control, consulting the collections of the Sichuan Opera Art Research Centre (Chengdu). I would also like to explore a number of cases on the rural/small town opera based in certain promising counties/districts historically important to the development of the opera, namely Yibin, Luzhou, Zigong, Hechuan, Jiangjin and Bishan.

Sounds Right!

---- an aural history of Cantonese Operatic Singings (1880s-2000)

May Bo CHING

Department of Chinese & History, City University of Hong Kong

Generally speaking, how Cantonese operatic songs counts substantially on how Cantonese are spoken. As well known among singers, composers and musicologists, “in Cantonese opera, linguistic tones play a major and critical role in the creative process of the melodic contour of the aria types”. Here, the “Cantonese opera” refers to the Cantonese opera which “is characterized by a great variety of tunes, a lyrical style of singing, a large instrumental ensemble, and spirited and clamorous percussion music, characteristics that were firmly established during the period of bold experimentation and reform in the 1920s and 1930s” (Bell Yung 1989). Understandably, there is a history about how Cantonese operatic singings evolved into what it looked like in the 1920s and 30s, and the evolution has been continuing from then on. This study therefore approaches the question from an earlier dates and extends the discussion to today. Considering the importance of linguistic tones, it first attempts to identify *the* Cantonese which has been considered more refined and urban since at least the nineteenth century. It then examines how this speech of urbanity was blended with local sing-song traditions and reshaped the Cantonese operatic singing. It explores how the flow of Cantonese population to Shanghai and San Francisco since mid-nineteenth century introduced other Chinese operatic and Western music practices (notably the use of violin, banjo and Hawaii guitar) into Cantonese operatic singings. It reviews how the emergence of gramophone records and radio broadcast, together with printed magazine published in Guangzhou and Hong Kong and distributed overseas, might have created a textual as well as an aural community among Cantonese all over the world. Side by side with these developments are the vocal evolution which has a gender perspective. Into the 1950s, the discussion on and the practices of the uses of voices in operatic singings were largely

politicized. The subsequent split in aesthetic criteria is still sensed strongly today. What is more essential is that the hearing and vocal organs have been reshaped. This study is therefore a historical exercise for experimenting how voices could have been “heard” from texts so as to recover the sensuous experience of that lost world. It is anthropological as whether certain sound “sounds right” does matter to insiders and it is a matter of how sound is perceived, judged, manipulated, and labelled.

Preliminary chapter titles:

Prelude

Sounds urban

Sounds local and Sounds right

[women] Sounds men, and vice versa

Sounds left

Sounds Hong Kong and Sounds Mainland

Sounds Odd

Epilogue

民国地籍整理与浙江乡村社会

研究提纲

浙江大学 杜正贞

清代中期以后，土地籍册、推收和田赋征派均为地方册书所把持。太平天国运动后，南方各省的官方地籍更遭到破坏。因此，民国初年北洋政府即开始地籍整理计划。地籍整理主要包括地籍调查测量和土地登记。浙江省民国时期反复进行验契契税运动、土地陈报、坵地图册编制、土地测量和不动产登记等等，均为地籍整理的系列举措。以往对于这些问题的研究，主要以总结地政历史经验为目的，论述民国政府政策的成败和得失。而对于这一系列政策在地方社会中的实际运作和民众的应对、利用，以及社会经济的改变，则较少论及。

本项研究将以近代浙江各乡村调查、民国土地诉讼、契税和土地测量、登记档案为主要史料，研究上述过程在社会经济层面的实际执行状况和反映。主要包括以下问题：1、在政府试图排除册书对地籍资料和赋税征派的控制的过程中，清代以来书差包征体制下的统治方式、官民关系和册书群体经历了怎样的变化？2、作为财政政策的一部分，北洋和国民政府都强调在诉讼中以各类官方证书替代私契作为管业凭证，以及民国后期的现代土地测量和不动产所有权登记，这些是否或如何触动了民间原来以私契管业的习惯和产权的观念？3、各阶层的人和各种社会组织如何在政局动荡、政策频繁变化和原有各自乡村的权力关系背景之下，诠释和利用了官方的法令和历次运动？等等。

民国地籍整理不能简单地看成是一个现代国家政策自上而下的推进过程，并在这个框架之下，解释其失败的原因。我将更强调，这个过程是在一个个具体的传统社会和地方政治架构的背景下进行的。这一方面表现在中央和省级制定的政策在地方的执行过程中，难以绕开地方原有的权力结构和制度；另一方面则表现在当政府力图绕过册书这一类的中介和代理，对民众和土地进行直接管控的时候，他们所面对的是彼此之间充满了矛盾和权利竞争的人群，所有的政策和行动都是在这样一个具有社会张力的人群关系中开展的。

Project overview: Social history of production in Hulunbuir: 1900-present

Thomas DuBois

Australian National University

Located on the elevated plateau of northern Inner Mongolia, the Hulunbuir (呼倫貝爾) region contains within it a wide diversity of productive activity, with distinct regions of grassland, farmland and forest, as well as mining and tourism. It is a center in its own right, and has at times been the specialized periphery of a variety of other centers both in and outside of China.

This project (which began as a historical study of the soybean industry in the Northeast) will examine the transformation of production in the Hulunbuir region. It begins with economic and political perspectives (i.e., the impact of the China Eastern Railway, rise and decline of specific trade networks, integration into command economies, etc.), but is fundamentally a *social* story. It focuses on two overall questions: how did productive changes transform social ties and identities, and how did social ties shape productive practices? The former (productive→social) is seen in the way that the changing distribution of rural markets shaped social interaction, how programs to open virgin land introduced waves of new migrants, and how the transformation of productive practices transformed regional and ethnic identities. The latter (social→productive) is seen in the way that personal networks channeled the contracting of formal and informal debt, the internal coherence of commercial houses and trade networks, and the development of secondary industries.

At present, I am working on three specific sub-projects on the transformation of stock herding, the provision of informal debt, and the structure of external trade. All three will combine Japanese and Chinese economic investigations with questionnaires and interviews conducted in conjunction with colleagues at Hulunbuir University. Having made some initial visits, we begin these investigations in earnest next year.

As to what I hope this project will contribute to the study of twentieth century China, each of the two directions of analysis (productive↔social) indicates a distinct opportunity. The literature on economic choice (and especially that on development) is generally quite good at seeing decisions made in aggregate. Yet these often blissfully deterministic perspectives are frequently wrong because they are largely blind to the *human* factors of economic change. This project will thus highlight the many ways that social factors influence, sometimes overwhelmingly, economic decisions. At the same time, anthropological literature is often unable to see the impact of economic transformation on the social and affective structures that it knows so well, especially when these changes occur over the long term. This project hopes to thoroughly understand these changes and their various agents (cadres, buyers, investors) over the course of the *entire* twentieth century as a way of understanding how they affected relations of trust, sentiment, community or identity.

Linking Deities with Political Power: Variations of “ritual practices” among the Tungus in Northeastern China from the early 20th century to the present

Aurore Dumont (CUHK)

This project will explore the variations of ritual practices and their transformation among the Tungus from the early 20th century to the present. The Tungus are a Manchu-Tungusic speaking “ethnic minority” scattered along the Russian and Mongolian borders of Northeastern China (Heilongjiang and Inner Mongolia provinces). While some groups are indigenous to the area and were formerly organized into the Manchu tribute and regional defense system, others crossed the boundaries of contemporary China between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century.

Deities worshipped by Tungus societies are considered to have their own efficacy reinforced by ritual practices. While they depend on the domestic economic activities of pastoralism in the Steppe and hunting and/or fishing in the Taiga (boreal forests), these ritual practices undertaken are performed in a variety of ways that may include collective rituals such as the *oboo* (sacred cairn) ceremony, games, and offerings. Through contacts with neighboring populations of Manchu, Mongol, Russian and Chinese people, the Tungus have been exposed to pluralistic religious practices, mainly Shamanism and Buddhism, which evolved in their culture through a gradual process of amalgamation. Similarly, the aims and content of ritual practices have responded to the shifting configurations of changing political power. But a central question remains: How were these “ritualized actions” reactive to and/or constitutive of various forms of political power (local and regional) and interethnic borrowings? The exploration of the parallel evolving relationship between the transformation of domestic economies (particularly due to advances in territorial control and the sedentarization process) and the purposes of rituals will form the starting point of the research. Consecutive phases of alteration and adaptation in the domestic economy appear to have correlated with the emergence or disappearance of deities. One perspective from the “bottom up”, i.e. from within the local Tungus societies, will shed light on the way the sacred space has been symbolically used and transformed among the “Tungus of the Steppe” under Mongolian influence and the “Tungus of the Taiga” under Chinese and Russian influence in a context of changing territorial control (through political adjustment). A second perspective sought from the “top down,” that is from the view of the Late Imperial, Republican and Communist states, will open a vantage point on the way Tungusic rituals and beliefs have been incorporated into particular political frameworks in local administrative areas (e.g. the banner, *sum* and league in the Steppe, “ethnic villages” in the Taiga). Through their support, were political authorities responsible for the gradual emergence and transformation of certain types of deities? What is the significance of certain rituals for local people given that some ritual events have been transformed nowadays into sports festivals and cultural performances by local governments?

By questioning the historical context, the adaptation and performative aspects of the Tungus’ rituals, this project will address the issue of Northern Chinese peripheral areas and their non-Chinese local populations. Indeed, the transformation and adjustment of the Tungus rituals provide a framework to conceive how peripheral local societies have been incorporated during the twentieth century into a regional centre. Together with fieldwork, different types of written sources (mainly local gazetteers, newspapers and travel records), will be used. Although there is data already available from previous fieldwork I conducted among the Evenki in Hulunbuir area, additional fieldwork will be done. The first will focus on the Hezhe people of the Ussuri River banks (Heilongjiang province). The second will be in Inner Mongolia among the Oroqen and the Evenki groups.

The Hanyeping Co. in Jiangxi, Hubei and Shanghai
David Faure

I have always been interested in Chinese corporate history in the late Qing and the Republic for I see in it an extension of the corporate history of the Ming and the Qing which was built around lineage and temple trusts. Hanyeping has always been interesting to me as one of several large-scale late Qing/Republican enterprises.

Some parts of Hanyeping's history have been quite fully researched. Zhang Zhidong founded the Hanyang Ironworks, the Daye and Pingxiang mines (respectively for iron ore and coal) around c. 1890. The scheme was poorly conceived and inadequately financed, and, so, by 1896, under duress, Sheng Xuanhuai was given the unenviable task of taking it over. Sheng brought the three companies out of "government-supervision and merchant-management" in 1908, and merged them into the Hanyeping company, which was run as a joint-stock enterprise. In 1911, Hanyang's operations were interrupted by the revolution, and Sheng Xuanhuai's own position was compromised by his support for the Qing regime. The astute politician that he was, nevertheless, he was back in the company soon afterwards. In the 1910s and 1920s, the company was beset by questions over Japanese loans and workers' movement (Anyuan was its mine in Pingxiang).

What struck me, when I visited Anyuan, was how modern the operation was. There isn't much that is left of the Hanyang Ironworks to visit, but looking at the plan and comparing what can be seen there to historical photographs, again, I am struck by the very workmanlike planning that went into the layout of the factory complex. There was a mismatch between the late Qing administrators' grasp of the magnitude of the undertaking and the professional management that they introduced. This was not an uncommon problem: the Industrial Revolution created not only machines, but also the specific roles that workers should perform around the machines. Importing the technology required importing also the social relationships so defined. The distinction between zhiyuan (staff) and gongren (workers) as quite a few books on late Qing/Republican industries have noticed was not a unique Chinese phenomenon. It was imported.

A second sort of problem arises from the merger. The consequence of merging the three companies was central direction from Shanghai (Hanyeping head office), and fairly autonomous workings at the mines and the factories. That is, with one proviso: because a considerable amount of raw and finished product moved among the three factories, and because Hanyeping, ultimately, was financed by shares and loans, the three companies were related to the Shanghai office through pricing and investment -- or its corollary, access to their assets to secure loans. There was no restructuring of the three companies that I know of, but some time in the 1920s, in face of business depression, head office did try to implement cost-cutting. I have yet to find out what it succeeded in doing.

There is yet a third aspect that I wish to consider but at the moment don't quite know how to go about. It has to do with the public image, or, rather, the lack of an image, of the company. Very few late Qing or Republican business companies seem to have paid much attention to their images, with perhaps the exception of the department stores (which projected the department store image to facilitate a banking business). The light-industry manufacturers producing for the consumer market (mostly flour, yarn and cloth) cared about the branding, but more the product than the corporation. The cities projected public images (Shanghai had an industry serving the purpose), and governments likewise. Zhang Jian at Nantong projected

an image of himself and his factories as the driving force of modernization in the city, an image that served his business purposes. I haven't yet gone through all of Hanyeping board meeting minutes, but I don't think so far I have come across any concern for its image. I would have thought a company would have been concerned with its own culture, and that with a merger, some effort might have had to be made to project the image of a collective purpose. I would have thought that bogged down by the question of Japanese loans, Hanyeping would have lobbied hard to pull itself out of the debt trap. I have seen little of that so far. It could well be that Sheng Xuanhuai was losing his grip and that the board was losing its directions in the 1920s. I shall keep looking.

A bad hypothesis is always better than no hypothesis. I think I am at the moment working on the supposition that Hanyeping's subsidiaries were technically proficient up to the First World War when it was being set up by (mainly European) engineers with purchased equipment. Head office had less clue about the mechanisms of mergers. Its fortune was carried by the times, head office being quite incapable of pro-actively responding to changes. Sheng Xuanhuai's family fortunes did not rest with Hanyeping alone. To him, Hanyeping might have been more of a chore than a challenge.

The typical village in modern Chinese history:
From Baiyangping village (Hunan) to Dazhai (Shanxi)
Anthony Garnaut, University of Melbourne

I am interested in the relationship between local histories, histories of typical localities and national histories. This interest comes out of two observations on different topics in modern Chinese history. I am encouraged to think about the relationship between local and national history within G. William Skinner's framework of Chinese space, but giving more prominence than Skinner did to social conflict.

1. Local historical time is discontinuous

In my study of a Muslim community in eastern Gansu, I noted that the value judgements attached to local events as recorded in local oral histories were often the exact opposite of those recorded by historians who assumed the perspective of the political and cultural centre of the Chinese national community. For example, the execution at Lingzhou, Ningxia in 1871 of Ma Hualong, preeminent leader of the Muslim "rebellion" of northwest China and shaykh of the Jahriyya religious order, was either the pivotal triumph of Zuo Zongtang's Northwest campaign and the end of serious opposition to the Tongzhi Restoration 同治中兴, or an act of self-sacrifice in the manner of the prophet Muhammad's grandson Hussayn at Karbala that opened the way to future Jahriyya triumphs. Similarly, the victory at the same place in 1911 of a Muslim militia led by Ma Hualong's son-in-law over a Elders and Brothers Society militia, was either a successful marker in the twentieth century movement towards Muslim self-rule in Ningxia or the still birth of the Republican revolutionary tradition in the Northwest. There are many other moments that are given wildly divergent interpretations by rival historical traditions, such as when Ma Hualong's grandson was targeted as the leading Muslim negative roll model in the 1958 mass campaign against religious privilege, or when one of his great-grandchildren was arrested in 1993 for inciting a group of his followers in a sectarian dispute. Each of these climactic events constitutes a rupture or in the local oral history tradition, where historical moments that occurred before the event are often remembered from a different perspective to those that occurred after. The inference I draw is that an abrupt change in the structure of local power leads to a break in local history, and a renegotiation of the relationship between local and national history.

2. The location of the typical Chinese village is unstable

A second observation came out of my work on the history of the Communist countryside. This history is told, to a greater extent than most, through typical locations: the borderlands of Hunan and Jiangxi for the Nanjing Decade; northern Shaanxi (Yan'an) or Hebei (Mantetsu survey villages) for the period of the Japanese Occupation; southern Shanxi (Long Bow village) or Henan for the 1950s; eastern Shanxi (Dazhai) for the Cultural Revolution; Shenzhen (*Chen Village*) or Wenzhou for the early Reform era. If we string these together, we have a history with a geographic centre that migrates across a range of a couple of thousand miles. How were these typical locations selected? Was it through a random process, or was there some sort of logic to it? Clearly, a component of the logic is driven by the practical constraints of field research in the PRC: typical villages have to be within a day's travel from a tertiary institution that can host foreign researchers, such as the location we are going to on Sunday.

3. The typical village is an intense case of a national problem

I think there is also a more meaningful logic at work, which can be approached by adding a social dimension to G. William Skinner's conception of Chinese space.

Skinner made several arguments about how the significance of local places was affected by broader (imperial/national) trends. In his 1971 article 'Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community : An open and shut case,' he argued that villagers were closed corporate communities in times of economic decline, and opened out on to a wider society in expansive economic times. In his 1984 AAS address, he argued that investment in transport infrastructure could shift the centre of the imperial world from one region to another, leading to the economic cycles of different regions being out of sync with one another (Fujian prospered while Henan reverted to pasture in the thirteenth century).

Skinner's views of the relationship between the local and the national were rather mechanical, and driven primarily by economic factors. I'm trying to formulate the relationship between national history and its typical locations as suggested by Skinner's spatial theory ("hierarchical regional space"), while taking seriously the basic principle of Marxist social history that history is driven forward by the resolution of socio-economic contradictions. I find the Chinese Communist practice of the typical survey 典型调查 relevant here. In Mao Zedong's formulation, drawing on the survey tradition of Frederick LePlay, a typical survey is a survey of a national problem in a local setting - an administrative village, a district, a battalion, a factory, a school. For a typical survey to be telling - for it to be possible to draw general, national conclusions from it, or to extrapolate from the single point to a wider area 从点到面 - certain socio-economic contradictions in that location must be seen as representative of contradictions at the national level.

This is where Baiyangcun and Dazhai come in. There is a small number of villages or larger rural precincts that, for a time, captivated the imagination of China's political elites as solutions to national problems. The peasant militias of Hunan and Anhui turned the tide in the Taiping crisis in favour of the Qing dynasty. To restate this with a bit more Skinnerian precision, the solution to the Taiping crisis came from the hills around the inland provincial capitals of Hunan and Anhui, the rural hinterlands of two of the largest Chinese towns that had not been forcibly incorporated into Western trading networks. If we were to write a history of the Tongzhi Restoration, we could do worse than approach this as the history of Xiangxiang 湘乡 in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, as Zeng Guofan promoted his home village of Baiyangcun as the typical village of the Restoration. Moving forward a hundred years, we can ask as a social historian why Dazhai in central Shanxi was promoted as the model village of the Cultural Revolution. Dazhai and the surrounding district was protected from the ravages of the Great Leap famine by its geography, too far from any major industrial centre to be a reliable source of grain and further protected by Shanxi's status as an exporter of coal, a commodity more highly prized by the planning system than grain. When Mao figured that the post-famine recovery period had gone on long enough and it was time to spur on the nation in a new round of forced industrialisation, eastern Shanxi was one of the few locations where it was possible to extract positive stories out of the recent history of Communist development. A history of these typical

villages offers many lessons for us of the ever-shifting alliance between town and countryside that animates modern Chinese history.

Position paper for the first workshop of the Historical Anthropology
of Chinese Society in the Twentieth Century

Local cults in Jiangnan from the late Qing to the present
Vincent Goossaert, EPHE

I have been working for some time on the history of Jiangnan as a local religious system, using primarily the huge amounts of published historical material, and also doing some fieldwork. For this particular project, I would like to start from my current hypothesis concerning the late Qing, post-Taiping situation in terms of the regulated relationships between the main actors (territorial communities, Buddhist and Daoist institutions, pilgrimage networks, spirit-medium cults, vernacular *baojuan* 寶卷 performers, lineages...) and see how these relationships have evolved until the present day. I am in particular interested in two questions: how did the territorial 社 cults and organization evolve, when their connection to the higher-order central temples weakened and in some cases dissolved? And, to what extent did spirit-medium cults take over some of their functions?

Leaving aside for now the question of how to define Jiangnan and where to draw boundaries, I am focusing on the greater Suzhou area. I would like to explore several territorial 社 cults around the city, as well as the famed Wutong 五通 possession cult which has actually thrived all through the twentieth century, and is now present among the newly reconstituted local territorial gods under official Daoist supervision. I hope to continue collecting and using published data (newspaper reports are a major source) and accessing archival material, as well as study current ritual practices (in local temples and at the Wutong main shrine in downtown Suzhou, on Shangfangshan), interview *baojuan* performers and Daoists, and study their manuscripts.

My hope is that this project will contribute to a better understanding of how the political, economic and social changes of the twentieth-century affected communal and ritual life at the family, village and neighborhood levels, less in terms of repression/resistance, or increased or decreased levels of practice, than in evolving divisions of labor and local regulations. The larger history of religious change in twentieth-century China has now been finely studied in a series of recent publications, and I suggest, with this case study, bringing the focus on how communal ritual life on the ground continues, adapts, and creates new regulations and systems as the larger conditions change.

Communal agriculture before collectivization? Ethnicity, politics and
Marxist theory in the making of Li history in Hainan

He Xi, CUHK

Ethnographic surveys were conducted of the Li people of the Wuzhishan area of Hainan province in the early 1950s as part of a national programme to delineate ethnic identities. They reported that the Li practiced a form of land ownership known as the hemu zhi (collective-acreage system). They described three types of hemu: simple collective consisting of members of a family, collectives consisting of members of family and persons purchased or adopted (known as dragon-sons -- longzi) from outside, and collectives that included a large number of purchased or adopted, as well as outside workers. The description contributed to the characterization of Li land-holding as the remnant of a patrilineal tribal society in which class differentiation had evolved.

Those were surveys conducted in 1956. They provide details that no comparable contemporary survey can aspire to. They are obviously very valuable records of Li history. In my current project to understand the passing of Li society, my problem is how they may be read.

In my paper, I shall show that the details contain in those reports conform quite closely to what I have been told in my visits to the same areas. Yet, my own interviews add a perspective which is not apparent from the published reports (although, one might say all the observations are there, if only one knew where to look). The reports follow a format which describes means of production, the material basis of culture, succession patterns, religion, and so on, but they do not show how the different aspects described under those heads came together to make up the whole. To historicize their descriptions, it will be necessary to inter-relate the different facets.

To take a very brief example, let me describe the position of the mutou (head of the acreage), described in the reports as the lineal descendant of previous mutou who had charge of the hemu. It must be first realized that the Li of Wuzhishan practiced slash-and-burn before land was opened for paddy farming. The mutou and his wife had a ritual role in the sowing of the first seeds in paddy land, but slash-and-burn was available to all members of the village within the territory that they held their own. Slash-and-burn, in fact, was subject to a different ceremony in which women were not present, as the spirits of the hills that had to be driven out were themselves female. The question arises, therefore, how the Li of Wuzhishan came to be introduced to paddy farming, an activity which required a different set of tools, different skills, and contributed to a different set of ideas of spoils division. This last, in fact, was not necessarily all that different from the practice of the hunt, where all in sight, including dogs, I was told, would be entitled to a share. And where might the land come from? I was told it could be purchased, apparently not always by money, but by cows. That opens the question to the nature of the economy, in which people and products traded for cows, skirts, and wine.

To see how skills might have been transported into the area, it is necessary to broaden the history and consider how skills indeed redefined ethnicity. It is commonplace to

describe Wuzhishan as a closed area that was eventually “opened up”. To set that in context, it is necessary to see that in the Ming dynasty, the Li were found on the plains of Hainan and that they integrated into the imperial state leaving little trace. The Wuzhishan Li were, indeed, the “last of the Lis” (title of my GRF project). Relatively secluded by poor transport earlier on, the area was penetrated by roads built in the late 1880s or early 1890s during Qing commander Feng Zicai’s “pacification” of the area. From that time on, ethnic labels were pinned on the Li people found in different parts of Wuzhishan. In the Qing, the term Ha was commonly used for the Li of the hills, with a distinction made for raw (sheng) and tamed (shu) Li. In my interviews, I was told about Li people up Wuzhishan having to pay a tax. That can be interpreted as the penetration of the government: the gazetteer records positions of zongguan (commander) and shaoguan (guard-post keeper) from the time of Feng Zicai, and up at Hongmao, quite high up on Wuzhishan, we came across people in Li villages holding ceremonial posts by such titles. They performed no guard duties but were needed in specific ceremonies. From the 1930s came the ethnographers. German Han Stubel came in 1931 and 1932, the Japanese Kanji Odaka came in 1942. From the late 1920s, because the Guomindang government had wanted to open Hainan for economic development, Chinese people also came (Huang Qiang in 1928), some carrying out official duties. By 1939, when the Japanese attacked Hainan, the Guomindang retreated up on Wuzhishan, leading very soon to the Baisha uprising of 1943 by the Li people. Stubel is particularly worth noticing, for he introduced the division of the Wuzhishan Li by their speech: the bendi (Baisha dong) Li, Meifu, Qi and Ha which continued into the 1950s and, indeed, to the present day.

Let me wind up with two stories. Up in Hongmao, someone told me this story about the Ledong people (on the coast to the west) coming up to Wuzhishan:

The Ledong people knew about herbs. There were lots of snakes on the hills, especially cobra (yanjing she) which the Qi Li feared. The Ledong people used to catch them by hand. When someone was bitten, and the Qi Li thought he or she would die, the Ledong people would let him or her lie down, and go back to their work. When they finished, they would take the person home, administer medicine, and the person would revive and even get up and join in eating the snake. The Li thought this was all magical and dared not touch the Ledong people. (Mar 11, 2015)

The Ledong people from the coastal area knew about paddy land. They came with the farm tools. The Li held them in awe for their knowledge of anti-toxin for snake bites. Likewise, they would have held in awe Feng Zicai’s guns. When Stubel went up Wuzhishan, he saw that some Li people had them.

Another image I have of Hainan comes from an account written by the Chinese author Lin Chaoren who was sent to Hainan just as war was breaking out to deal with the salt reserve. He saw Wang Zhaoyi, dressed in Western suit, and he noticed that the women of the house were also smartly dressed. We know why: in 1934, Wang had been sent to Guangzhou for military training. I think my story of the last of the Li has to include this image: the hemu cultivation was continuing from the 1890s, the mutou and his wife still turned up for the sowing ceremony, the hills were still being opened for slash and burn, the Guomindang were building on the infrastructure that had been started by Feng Zicai, and

here in 1939, the Li headman and his family were rapidly converted to ways of the city. This is the background to understanding the hemu zhi. The Li were not only converted in how they lived, but were also being put in a history that outside world might understand.

Real Property and Urban Space Changes in Modern Guangzhou (1900-1936)

Huang Sujuan

Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

Real property in cities has never been legally defined by the civil law in imperial China. There were no obvious differences between urban and rural areas. The tax system, the law regulation, commercial network, and even culture and ideology was similar. Mote called it "urban-rural continuum". Guangzhou was the provincial capital in Ming and Qing dynasty. When modern idea of municipality was being introduced into China, Guangzhou underwent great changes like other treaty ports. City walls were torn down, roads were widened, and new forms of transportation, public utilities, and civic spaces were introduced. By focusing on the changes in the construction landscape of Guangzhou, I suggested real property was redefined through erection of new rules and regulations by municipal authorities for the dual objectives. That is securing revenue and acquiring land for public works. The whole process includes four stages.

The first stage is in the late Qing reform movement from 1900-1911. During this time, the main expansion of Guangzhou was the construction of the Bund. The Bund eventually developed into a new economic and political center of the city. The reason why the construction of the Bund could be successful is that it didn't trigger real property issues. It's just reclaiming the Zhujiang River. While at the same time another 1907 Planning was failure, for thousands of huts within the planning area needed to be demolished and this met the strong resistance of the residents.

The second stage is from 1912-1920, during this period Guangdong Military government took charge of "official land" (Guanchan or Gongchan) and saw it as one way to increase revenue. "Official land" means real property that belongs to the local government in Qing dynasty, including Yamens in different levels. Selling official land brought in a handsome sum to the government. What's more important is using the name of official land, the demolition of city wall was carried out. According to the Municipal Office, city walls were official land and those residents lived at the foot of city walls had long occupied illegally. They would only be paid a symbolic compensation, not the land price. But in order to persuade the residents agreed to pull down their houses or shops for the road construction, Municipal Office made concessions that they can construct arcades. The government created a new term named "arcade land", and this laid the foundation for the mass construction of arcades.

The third stage is from 1921-1925. Guangzhou Municipality (Guangzhou shizhengting) established in 1921. It used Municipal land to distinguish official land which was under the control of the Guangdong Province Government. Municipal land was extended to all public land resources. Such as moat, canal, beach land; arcade land, waste land in blocked streets; temples and temple property. Municipality sold a large number of municipal lands. This provoked bitter resistance among the people of Guangzhou, especially in the realm of temples. Protest came from almost every street. This resulted in the establishment of the "Land Certification Bureau" (Minchan

baozhengju) in 1923.

The fourth stage is from 1926-1930s, during this period the government managed private property rights systematically through land registration. The Bureau of Land (Guangzhoushi Tudiju) under the Municipality set up in 1926. It required people to register all kinds of ownership, including land-ownership, lease in perpetuity, living pledge, hypothec, ownership of the bottom of the shop or the cover of the shop. Chambers of commerce in Guangzhou negotiated with the government for several months of intense bargaining. The registration fee was the key point of the contention. By May 1927, all disputes were settled through consultations.

With the totally control of the land resource in Guangzhou, the government's plan to build a modern city was soon in full swing. Most of public buildings were erected on official land and Municipal land. By the end of the 1930s the city landscape of a modern Guangzhou took shape across an urban-rural continuum. It was the result of much resistance, negotiation, and compromises, rather than urban planning with mere aesthetic concerns.

Ritual Specialists and Communal Life in Western Hunan

Paul R. Katz (康豹)

Distinguished Research Fellow

Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History

This project represents the continuation of my research on the roles that ritual specialists play in Miao 苗 communities located in Western Hunan (Xiangxi 湘西). It will involve the collection of archival materials and ritual texts, but mainly fieldwork observing rituals and doing interviews with specialists in Fenghuang 鳳凰 County. In addition, this project will endeavor to address the larger issue of the manifold forms of interaction between Daoist and indigenous ritual traditions, as well as engage in comparisons to other areas of Southwest China. In considering these phenomena, I will strive to address some of the questions that lie at the heart of our project, including the development of new forms of discourse and practice during the twentieth century, as well as how they may have shaped the formation of diverse identities. In the case of Western Hunan, I will also consider the impact of this region's long history of militarization and warfare.

Previous historical research has provided stimulating analyses of how Daoism spread to Southwest China from Zhejiang 浙江, Fujian 福建, and Jiangxi 江西, including the Shenxiao 神霄 and Tianxin zhengfa 天心正法 traditions. However, more recent scholarship, and in particular ethnographic studies, has begun to challenge the tendency to consider Daoism's interaction with non-Han groups from a top-down perspective, thereby portraying it as a "civilizing agent" that helped to promote processes of sinicization. While some non-Han groups have absorbed many elements of Daoist liturgies, others have successfully preserved indigenous ritual traditions, with some local communities adopting facets of Daoism as protective coverings for their ritual traditions, which often proved highly resilient despite the effects of Han Chinese hegemony. One proof of this hypothesis is the presence of ritual specialists who perform in local languages. My research has found similar patterns among Western Hunan's ritual specialists, particularly the following three types: 1) Male specialists who refer to themselves as "*badaizha*" (巴代扎; usually labeled "Ke laoshi 客老師" by local scholars and officials), who perform rites largely derived from Daoist traditions using both local dialect (*tuhua* 土話) and Han Chinese; 2) Male specialists who refer to themselves as "*badaixiong*" (巴代雄; usually labeled "Miao laoshi 苗老師" by local scholars and officials), who generally perform rituals in Miao based on oral traditions that exhibit markedly less Daoist influence; and, 3) Male and female spirit mediums who refer to themselves as "*zimei*" (子妹) and also tend to perform rituals in Miao (women are usually labeled "*xianniang* 仙娘" while men can be called "*xianshi* 仙師"). My partners and I have also made efforts to collect data on the altar troupes (*tanban* 壇班) of some of these specialists, using GIS technology to map the territories they cover.

Focusing attention on the roles ritual specialists play in communal life may prompt us to reassess previous arguments about the top-down flow of knowledge at the local level. At the same time, I hope to compare my results with those of other project members (Vincent Goossaert, for example) in order to formulate a broader explanation of how local communities adapted to and innovated in the face of the unprecedented challenges of twentieth-century Chinese history.

Violence, Culture, and Social Change in Northern Jiangsu, 1900-1958

Jan Kiely (CUHK)

Extraordinary violence experienced on a mass scale surely constitutes one of the central transformative forces of twentieth century Chinese history. The extent of this violence was not limited to the most obvious forms of killing, maiming, and general dehumanization recognized as acts of "war" and "revolution," but more broadly as sustained interrelating processes of destruction, repression, cooptation, on the one hand, and construction, liberation, and exclusion on the other. The tendency to envision such violence on the grand scale of narratives of war and revolution and, more recently, in projects intent on producing an accounting of twentieth century horror and atrocity leave us with grand abstractions of suffering that may distort and obscure such violence as historical experience and transformative force, and so also misread its social consequences. Some promising efforts (Rowe 2006, Thaxton 2008) have pointed to the potential for avoiding the pitfalls of the grand perspective by examining violence in its local setting. My experiment for this project proceeds in the hope that the disruptive methods of microhistory and historical anthropology might make it possible to attain a deeply grounded, multidimensional perspective on the place of violence in the historical experience and evolution of one place in twentieth century China.

Part of a larger study of several communities in Anhui and Jiangsu, this project examines Shuyang County (流陽縣), a peripheral northern Jiangsu plains county of little seeming historical significance, from the end of the Qing Empire to the early years of the Maoist state. For all who recall Chen Yung-fa's classic 1986 study (*Making Revolution*) of the multi-sided wartime struggles involving Japanese, collaborationist, KMT and CCP forces in central-eastern China, it will come as no surprise that Shuyang was one of the places caught up in that vortex of violence. My preliminary research shows that the wartime violence followed on several decades of rising intrusions of military forces, repeated invasions by large-scale bandit forces, and two KMT military seizures of the county, and that the post-1945 civil war period brought a significant escalation of mass violence that had repercussions well after the last formal KMT forces were driven from the county in 1948. But Shuyang people were not simply passive victims of these external forces; they forcefully resisted and allied themselves with outsiders; and the conflicts among themselves (in a region where one 1930s researcher noted "people are wilder than in the other parts... fighting is more favored than talking") often superseded, and became entangled with, conflicts brought by outsiders. As much as today's Shuyang may bury this past under promotions of itself as a rapidly urbanizing zone of advanced economic development (notably in high tech and horticulture) with a sanitized, glorious revolutionary past, persistent violence often on a large-scale was central to its twentieth century history.

This project aims to consider the intersecting forms of violence represented by intrusions by outsiders (external) and the actions of locals (internal) relating to what preliminary study shows to be eight general (often interrelated) sources of violence within the county. These briefly are: 1) the ecological problem of frequent flooding and matters of water management; 2) economic competition over land and trade (particularly the movement of salt across the county from the coastal salt producing areas); 3) intra-social elite competition over the reins of state authority and cultural authority; 4) tensions over social and gender hierarchy; 5) threats to local community moral-spiritual order; 6) capacity for conflict resolution in instances of spontaneous affrays in "public" spaces; 7) intrusions by outside armed forces (often claiming the mantle of state authority); 8) expansions of state ordering of society.

As is suggested by some of these categories, violence even in the most chaotic of times was constantly being countered and engaged with (and sometimes abetted by) at least three forces of order-making: that of 1) the assertion of state authority; 2) elite projects of cultural ordering; and 2) the maintenance of harmonious local community moral-spiritual order. In this last respect, preliminary research suggests examining a series of natural-social micro-ecologies within the county (not just discrete villages or towns) may prove fruitful.

The village quartet continued: observations in Anhui, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian

John Lagerwey (CUHK)

“The Village Quartet” is the title of a chapter by Joseph McDermott in *Modern Chinese Religion I: Song-Liao-Jin-Yuan* (Brill, 2014), pp. 169-228. In it he discusses the four religious institutions around which village life was organized in the late Song and Yuan: the territorial, ascriptive earth god 社, popular gods and their temples, Buddhist temples (and notably the “merit temples” 功德堂), and kinship institutions. The last, he observes, were still very weak at the end of the Yuan, but the practices and ideology that would come to define ancestral halls were already very much embedded in the three other institutions. My question, then, is simple: what would a photograph of these four institutions look like in 1949 in the four regions where I have done fieldwork?

Soil, Society, and the State in Modern China: Shaanxi's Loess Plateau

Micah Muscolino

Most of my summer was spent working in archives and conducting (very) preliminary fieldwork for a new project on soil and society in the loess plateau from the 1860s to the 1960s. Social historians write "history from the bottom up," beginning with experiences of ordinary people at the bottom of social hierarchies. For environmental historians, history from the bottom up might begin with soil and its history, since that is in many ways the basis of human affairs. Historians of China (and indeed most environmental historians) have rarely considered the history of soils and their relation to human societies. Robert Marks has recently argued that by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries China's farming system caused progressive loss of nutrients, so that in the 1950s – or possibly earlier – nearly all farmland in China was deficient in nutrients essential for plant growth. Yet his evidence is hardly conclusive and China's ecological diversity militates against easy generalizations on this issue. Testing this hypothesis demands more in-depth research on the temporal and spatial patterns of China's soil history.

Methods drawn from historical anthropology are useful for such an inquiry because, as Blaikie and Brookfield point out, land degradation is by definition a *social* problem in terms of its causes and consequences. Defining environmental change as "degradation" implies social criteria related to the land and its possible uses. Hence, degradation -- literally meaning "reduction to a lower rank" -- is perceptual and socially defined. Multiple and competing definitions of degradation exist among land-users in any given place and time, as different groups perceive and use the land and its resources in different ways. Land degradation and land management thus have to be understood with explicit reference to concrete social processes. What perceptions of environmental change existed in China during the late nineteenth and twentieth century, when soils may have been becoming increasingly depleted? Politics matters as well. From the late 1930s onwards, the Chinese state advocated a particular view of degradation, as it promoted visions of soil conservation developed in the United States and later the Soviet Union. How did these ideas and programs fit into the new social and ecological contexts that characterized twentieth-century China?

Valuable sources for addressing these questions are found in the reports generated by water and soil conservation survey teams (shuitu baochi chakandui 水土保持查勘队) formed in 1953 by the Yellow River Conservancy Commission, the Chinese Academy of Science, and the Central Agricultural Ministry. These groups deputed technical and administrative personnel to carry out comprehensive surveys of the Wudinghe 无定河, Jinghe 泾河, Weihe 渭河, Yanhe 延河, and Beiluohe 北洛河 watersheds (as well as other river basins in the loess plateau region), investigating local histories, socio-economic and environmental conditions, and land-management practices. I will start by analyzing these reports alongside other archival documents. My reading of the textual sources will be supplemented and enriched by fieldwork conducted in Shaanxi in collaboration with colleagues from Shaanxi Normal University.

1920-40年代赣南乡村中的阶级革命与宗族变动

饶伟新（厦门大学历史系）

20世纪以来发生的一系列重大社会政治变革，对中国传统乡村社会的结构变动与变迁带来诸多层面的影响。本文聚焦于1920-30年代中共在赣南乡村地区发动的土地革命，考察这场以阶级斗争为指导的土地革命（阶级革命）对当地农村宗族社会的影响。我将以中央苏区腹地——雩都县北部赖村、水溪一带的地方宗族为主要研究对象，利用族谱、契约等家族文献和实地调查资料，从乡村社会的角度，着重考察当地宗族如何应对这场阶级革命，以及革命之后直到1949年新政权建立之前的这段时间，乡村宗族是如何重建和延续的。

具体来说，本文讨论三个方面的问题：首先是关于“阶级革命”的问题。中共自身的史料显示，中共试图以打土豪分田地和查阶级查田的革命路线，发动大规模的分田、查田运动，动员广大农民群众参加红军，但地方上并没有完全按照中共的理解和意图开展土地革命，如地方干部和基层革命组织常常把贫农雇农当作地主富农，或者把地主富农当作贫农雇农，甚或与地主富农妥协、合谋，导致阶级划分不清、土地分配不到位的问题，结果出现大量工农群众“反水”和地主富农破坏革命的现象。这些现象反映了中共“阶级革命”与乡村社会结构之间的内在矛盾，同时也引导我们从乡村社会内部来思考土地革命。

由此引出本文要讨论的第二个重要问题，即关于乡村宗族如何应对阶级革命的问题。宋代以后特别是16世纪以来形成的乡村宗族，内部高度认同与整合，同时也充满矛盾和分化。当阶级革命到来时，宗族内部的不同房支、不同成员，以及不同姓氏的宗族（如大族与小族），由于各自所处的社会地位和利益考量，包括各自对“阶级”、“革命”的理解各不相同，因此对待阶级革命的态度、行为和策略并不一致，导致阶级革命不是完全按照中共的意图，而很大程度上是根据本地的矛盾关系和社会模式而展开。我打算把雩都北部的“革命者”、“反革命者”和“被革命者”，还原到他们各自的家族谱系上，分析他们之间原有的社会身份和权力关系，探察阶级革命与宗族结构之间是如何相互影响的。

最后是关于阶级革命退却之后乡村宗族社会重建的问题。我将主要考察雩都北部地方宗族在1935-1949年期间收复族产、重建宗祠和续修族谱等方面的活动，分析家庭结构、宗族关系以及宗族的历史记忆与话语表述有何新的变化，探讨阶级革命在多大程度上影响了乡村宗族社会的变动与自我调整。

Reinventing Chinese Tradition: Cultural Politics of Late Socialism
Ka-ming, WU

My project focuses on the ways rural folk culture figures in today's Yan'an, China, paying attention to its relationship with the local governments, urban intellectuals and rural villagers in the context of rapid urbanization. Yan'an is the birthplace of the CCP's revolution and where Mao Zedong delivered the renowned Talks at the Yanan Forum on Literature and Art. "Folk culture in Yan'an" denotes a major mode of cultural control and cultural politics in modern China. My project is both historical and contemporary. It asks how certain folk cultural practices were linked to modern revolutionary politics and mass mobilization strategies during Mao's period and how they transform into traditional heritages today.

My work examines three rural cultural practices: folk paper-cutting, Shaanbei shuoshu (folk storytelling) and folk religion of spirit cults. I see these practices as major sites where folk knowledge and ritual traditions are disseminated and where national politics, local religious revival, government and intellectual interventions take place. Looking at the ways these stakeholders mobilize, commodify and manipulate folk cultural practices, I argue that folk culture in today's Yan'an has shifted from a site of control to a site of contest, with uneasy politics of appropriation and engagements.

My work contributes to more complicated understanding of cultural politics in today's rural China. I avoid the dichotomized assumptions of a hegemonic part-state and subjugated people and instead highlight the integration of state and society. I also avoid to overemphasize the concept of diffused power lest it might distract us from understanding the Chinese state and capital power becoming more controlling in the new era. In the end I find it important to hold two poles of critique at that same time. I show that Chinese folk discourse and practices uniquely situate in a late socialist condition where the strong party-state control, burgeoning market forces, and uneven rural urban development get caught up with the late capitalist anxiety over the vanishing of national cultural identity and associated consumption of folk authenticity. The situation is further complicated by intense urbanization within and outside of the rural area.